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VALIDITY OF A DEFENSE THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS NOT SATISFIED, IN CASES OF
CONTRACT WHEREIN IT WAS SPECIFIED
THAT THE STIPULATIONS OF THE OTHER
PARTY SHOULD BE PERFORMED TO HIS
SATISFACTION.
When two parties have entered into a contract, performance
by the one is often a necessary preliminary to the maintenance
of an action against the other for non-performance. This per-
formance, moreover, must be in accordance with the terms of
the contract as construed by the court. For it is the province
of the court to determine, by construction, the meaning of- an
express contract, and, in doing this, the guiding principle is to
effectuate the intention of the parties. Express contracts are
given a construction which will bring them as near the actual
meaning of the parties as the language used permits.
Interesting questions of construction arise when one of the
parties to the contractual obligation has undertaken that per-
formance on his part shall be to the satisfaction of the other
party. These questions are usually presented when suit is
brought upon such a contract, and the party to whom satisfaction
was guaranteed sets up as a defense that he was not satisfied.
It then devolves upon the court to decide upon the validity of
this defense, and this is determined by finding the meaning of
provision guaranteeing the defendant's satisfaction, or by con-
struing the contract. Three constructions have been suggested.
By the first, the defendant is made the sole judge as to whether
the stipulations of the other party have been performed to his
satisfaction, and the honesty of his decision cannot be ques-
tioned. By the second, the defendant is the sole judge, but his
decision must be made honestly and in good faith. The third
imposes upon the defendant a duty to act reasonably. Under
this the contract is held to be performed to the defendant's sat-
isfaction if the performance would be satisfactory to a reason-
able man.
The first of these constructions, although sustained by
numerous dicta, seems to lack the support of judicial decision.
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On reviewing the authorities, it is found to be without the direct
sanction of a single case. The main contention usually is
whether to apply the second or the third construction. By some
courts the second construction is always applied, and the
defendant's honest judgment is held to determine conclusively
the satisfactoriness of the plaintiff's performance. Other
courts apply this construction only to contracts made "to grat-
ify taste, serve personal convenience or satisfy individual pre-
ferences." 1 The third construction, requiring the defend-
ant to act reasonably, is applied by these courts to all other
contracts. From what has been said, it will be readily seen
that, in all jurisdictions, contracts containing the personal ele-
ment above referred to, receive the same construction. It may
be well, therefore, to review the cases in which contracts of
this nature are construed, before turning to those in which a
different rule of construction is applied in different jurisdic-
tions. This review of the authorities is to be, for the most
part, illustrative, and the citations are intended to be typical
rather than exhaustive.
The case of Zaleski v. Clark ' is a good illustration of the
construction given a contract falling within the rule applicable
to contracts made "to gratify taste, serve personal convenience
or satisfy individual preferences." In this case the plaintiff, a
sculptor, brought an action for the price of a bust which he had
made of the defendant's deceased husband. The bust had been
made under a contract which expressly provided that the de-
fendant need not pay the purchase price unless satisfied with
it. The defendant was not satisfied because it had not the
expression of the deceased during his life, and this was held to
be a good defense to the maintenance of the action, although
the fault was not the result of imperfect workmanship, but
because of the nature of a bust, as a dead white model and
necessarily destitute of the expression of color and life. The
fact that the defendant ought to have been satisfied, it was held,
was immaterial.
Brown v. Foster' is another case of this class. There the
plaintiff, a tailor, had agreed to make the defendant a suit of
clothes to his satisfaction. The defendant was not satisfied
with the clothes and returned them, refusing even to allow the
plaintiff to make alterations. In an action for the price it was




proved by other tailors that the clothes were well made, except
for a slight defect which could be easily remedied. Neverthe-
less, it was held that the action would not lie. "Although," said
Devens, J., "the compensation of the plaintiff for valuable ser-
vice and materials may thus be dependent upon the caprice of
another who unreasonably refuses to accept the articles manu-
factured, yet he cannot be relieved from the contract into which
he has voluntarily entered." So also where the plaintiff had
undertaken to make an enlarged picture of the defendant's
deceased daughter," and in another case, where the contract
was to make a crayon portrait of the defendant and his wife,'
the same conclusion was reached. In both cases the plaintiff
had undertaken that the work should be satisfactory to the
defendant, and in both cases the dissatisfaction of the defend-
ant, whether reasonable or not, was held to be a valid defense.
These views are also entertained in England, where it was
decided by Cresswell, J., Williams, J., and Willis, J., concurring,
that a contract to build a pony-phaeton to meet the defendant's
approval, "not only on the score of workmanship, but also that
of -convenience and taste," gave the defendant a right to reject
it, provided he acted b6na fide!
Contracts of service containing a stipulation for satisfaction
also seem to belong to this category, whenever the services to
be rendered are of a personal nature. And so in New York,
where the distinction is made between contracts involving ele-
ments of personal taste and convenience and those which do
not, it was held that an agent employed for a year, provided he
"could fill the place satisfactorily," might be discharged by the
employer whenever dissatisfied.' The view that this decision,
which is followed -in a later case,' was based upon the theory
that the contract involved was within the ruie applicable to
contracts made to serve personal taste or convenience, is sup-
ported by the opinion of Danforth, J., in Boiler Co. v. Garden.
Numerous other cases have included the construction of service
contracts of this nature and, wherever the services have been
of a personal nature, the conclusion has been the same."
4 Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49.
5 Moore v. Goodwin, 43 Hun. 534. See also Hoffman v. Galaher, 6 Daly
42. (Friend's satisfaction.)
6Andrews v. Belfield, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 779.
Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 280.
'Spring v. Clock Co., 24 Hun x75.
ioi N. Y. 387, 390.
"Harder v. Board of Commx, 97 Ind. 455; Durgin v. Baker, 32 Me. 273.
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But in those jurisdictions which have not a uniform rule of
construction it is essential that the services to be rendered are
of a personal nature. Otherwise the contract would receive a
construction requiring the employer to act as a reasonable man
in dismissing the employee. This is well illustrated by two
recent New York cases, the facts of which are'almost identical.
In both of these cases dramatic artists were employed under
contracts which reserved to the employer the right to dismiss
them, if at any time he should be satisfied, in good faith, that
they were incompetent, and in each case it was held that this
gave the employer no arbitrary right of dismissal." The opin-
ions in these cases are somewhat involved, because of certain
limiting terms in the contracts to be construed, but it seems to
have been clearly the intention of the learned judges to keep
the construction of contracts for this kind of services without
the rule applicable to contracts involving elements of personal
taste and convenience. This view, moreover, finds support in
the opinion of Andrews, Ch. J., in one of the cases under con-
sideration.' So also a contract to alter certain boilers providing
for payment when the employer is "satisfied that the boilers as
changed are a success," was expressly held not to be within the
rule of construction applied when the object of the coutract is
to "gratify taste, serve personal convenience or satisfy indi-
vidual preference.""
The same principles control service contracts for a definite
pbriod, which contain a stipulation that the employee may
leave whenever dissatisfied. In these cases, provided the ser-
vices are of a personal nature, the employee may quit the em-
ployment whenever he is dissatisfied, and recover for services
actually rendered, although his departure was before the ex-
piration of his term." The fact that the employee has no good
reason for his dissatisfaction is immaterial."
As already indicated, contracts expressly stipulating for
satisfaction, but which are not made to gratify taste, serve per-
sonal convenience or satisfy individual preference, do not
receive the same construction in all jurisdictions. It is in
regard to contracts of this nature that the authorties are in
conflict, and the contention, above referred to, whether to apply
" Smith v. Robson, 148 N. Y. 252; Grinnell v. Kiralfy, 55 Hun 422.
" Smith v. Robson, i48 N. Y. 252, 255-6.
"s Boiler Co. v. Garden, ioi N. Y. 387, 39o.
" Rossiter v. Cooper, 23 Vt 522; Provost v. Harwood, 29 Vt. 219; Sloan v.
Hayden, uio Mass. 141; Moffatt v. Dickson, 13 Com. B. 543.
Is Rossiter v. Cooper, 23 Vt. 522, 524-5.
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the construction requiring the defendant to act reasonably or
that allowing the defendant's judgment, honestly exercised, to
determine the satisfactoriness of the plaintiff's performance, is
most marked.
The New York courts are the leading exponents of the con-
struction of this class of contracts, by which the defendant is
required to act as a reasonable man. This view seems to have
been instituted by Kent, Ch. J., in Follard v. Wallace." In that
case the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain sum if
satisfied that the title to a piece of land, conveyed to him by the
plaintiff, was undisputed. In a suit upon this contract it was
held that dissatisfaction, without some good reason therefor,
was no defense; "the law," said the court, "will determine for
the defendant when he ought to be satisfied." This decision
was followed in a later case where specific performance of a
similar contract was granted." In two very recent cases the
same conclusion has been reached and contracts to convey "sat-
isfactory" titles have received a construction requiring the
title only to be "marketable."
8 It is true that in one case in
this jurisdiction it was held that an action for the price of a
steamboat sold under a contract containing a stipulation for
satisfaction, would not lie unless the vendee was in fact satis-
fied, and whether or not the vendee ought in reason to have
been satisfied was immaterial. 9 This conclusion, however,
which has only the sanction of a Supreme Court decision which
was not unanimous, is so inharmonious with more recent cases
that it may be regarded as virtually overruled. The case of
Doll v. Noble 2 0 more correctly illustrates the present law of
New York. In that case an action was brought to recover
money due upon a contract for polishing and staining the wood-
work of two houses. It had been provided in the contract that
the work should be done "to the entire satisfaction" of the
defendant, but this, it was held, gave the defendant no right to
defeat a recovery by unreasonably saying that he was not satis-
fied. The case of Boiler Co. v. Garden 
2 and the two cases con-
struing contracts for services of theatrical performers," which
"2 Johns, N. Y. 397.
Rigney v. Coles, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 479.
I8 Jay v. Wilson, 91 Hun 391; Moot v. Business Men's Investment Ass'n,
157 N. Y. 201.
"1 Gray v. R. R. Co., ii Hun 70.
20 x6 N. Y. 230.
21 101 N. Y. 387.
22 Smith v. Robson, 148 N. Y. 252; Grinnell v. Kiralfy, 55 Hun 422.
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have been referred to in another connection, are also good
illustrations of the principles now under consideration.
Illinois has adopted a similar construction of contracts of
this nature, and in a recent case in that State, a contract to
grade some land to the satisfaction of the defendant was held
to be performed when the grading was done in a manner satis-
factory to the mind of a. reasonable man." Other views were
advanced in an early case,2" but these must now be considered
repudiated.
In most jurisdictions, however, the rule of construction is
uniform. Contracts of this kind receive the same construction
that is given contracts involving elements of personal taste and
convenience, and the defendant's honest judgment is held to
determine whether or not the plaintiff's performance is satis-
factory to him. This construction was applied in Massachusetts
in the case of McCarren v. McNulty,"'where the plaintiff had
undertaken to build a book-case for a society, and to finish it in
a manner satisfactory to the president of the society. It was
decided in this case that, unless the book-case was satisfactory
to the president of the society, there could be no recovery for
labor and materials; for, from the consequences of the plain-
tiff's own bargain, the law would afford him no relief. So
where a machine for generating gas was sold under a contract
providing for the repayment of the purchase price in case the
vendee was not satisfied, it was held that, if the vendee was
not satisfied, an action by him to recover the purchase price
would lie, and it was immaterial that the machine was an excel-
lent one." In Vermont, also, the same constrction was applied
in McClure v. Briggs." In that case the plaintiff's agent set up
an organ for the defendant, under an agreement giving to the
defendant the right to reject it if not satisfied with it. The
defendant honestly thought he was dissatisfied, although with-
out cause, and this, it was held, was a good defense to an action
for the price. If the dissatisfaction was real and not feigned,
honest and not pretended, the plaintiffs had not fulfilled their
contract. The same conclusion was also reached in Vermont, in
two earlier cases, one involving the construction of a contract
for the sale of a set of milk pans,'" the other the construction of
23Keeler v. Clifford, i65 IIl 544.
24Goodrich v. Van Nortwick, 43 Ill. 445.
2 7 Gray -139.
26 Aiken v. Hyde, 99 Mass. 183.
" 58 Vt. 82.
" Daggett v. Johnson, 49 Vt. 345.
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a contract for the sale of a sugar evaporator," and both contain-
ing a stipulation for satisfaction.
Several recent cases have settled the question in Pennsyl-
vania. In one of these an action was brought to recover the
purchase price of a reaper and binder, sold on condition that it
should prove satisfactory to the defendant. A charge to the
jury that, if the defendant had reasonable cause to be displeased
with the machine he had the right to reject it, was held to be
erroneous; and it was decided that the defendant had the right
to reject it if his objections were made in good faith, and it was
immaterial how unreasonable or ill-founded they might appear
to others."0 This conclusion has been firmly maintained in three
other cases in the same jurisdiction." Similar contracts for the
sale of machines have several times come before the courts of
Michigan, and in every case have received a construction per-
mitting the defendant, provided he acted in good faith, to be
the sole judge as to whether or not the stipulations of the plain-
tiff had been performed to his satisfaction." In one of these
cases the machine was accidentally burned before the defend-
ant had concluded that it satisfied him. It was, therefore, de-
cided that the loss should fall upon the plaintiff." So also in
Wisconsin, in the case of a similar contract for the sale of
exhaust fans to be used in the defendant's blacksmith shops, a
demurrer to an answer, setting up that the defendant was
honestly and in good faith dissatisfied with the fans, was held
to have been properly overruled."
In Virginia it was decided that an action would not lie to
compel specific performance of a contract to purchase land, the
title to which was to be satisfactory to the vendee, unless the
vendee was in fact satisfied with the title; and if the vendee
was in good faith not satisfied, it made no difference that the
title was really good. Two cases in Maryland. have decided
that when a railroad company has contracted to purchase
supplies, provided they are satisfactory to certain agents of the
"Manufacturing Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528.
"Seeley v. Welles, 120 Pa. 69.
3 Boiler Works v. Schmader, E55 Pa. 394; Howard v. Smedley, 14o Pa.
81; Singerley v. Thayer, io8 Pa. 291.
3 0Platt v. Broderick, 38 N. W. R. 579 (Mich); Piano Manufacturing Co. v.
Ellis, 35 N. W. R. 841 (Mich.); Pierce v. Cooley, 23 N. W. R. 31o (Mich.); Ma-
chine Co. v. Smith, So Mich. 565.
"Pierce v. Cooley (supra).
4Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 218.
3 Averett v. Lipscombe, 76 Va. 404.
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company, the agents designated may, in the exercise of fair
and honest judgment, reject the supplies, and the company will
not then be liable for the purchase price." These conclusions
have also the support of a decision in Minnesota," and of dicta
in Indiana" and California."
The Federal Courts have given their support to this con-
struction in two well considered cases. In one of these it was
held that a fire engine, sold with a warranty that it would be
satisfactory to a committee representing the defendant, might
be rejected by the defendant if the committee were not satis-
fied with it."' In the other, after a review of the authorities, a
similar decision was made."' The courts of England have taken
the same view, although there are dicta to the contrary.' A
few decisions, which at first sight seem conflicting, can proba-
bly be distinguished." The case of Grafton v. Eastern Counties
Railway" may be considered a correct illustration of the English
law on this subject. In that case the plaintiff had contracted
to furnish the defendant with a quantity of coke satisfactory to
the defendant's inspecting officer. It was held that a declara-
tion, which failed to allege that the officer was satisfied, was
demurrable. In another case an action was brought for work,
labor and materials. The defendant's plea alleged a contract
which they might terminate if not satisfied. A replication by
the plaintiff that the defendants ought reasonably to have been
satisfied was held, on demurrer, to be no answer to the plea."
3
Several earlier decisions are also to the same effect."
It has been seen that but three constructions of contracts of
this nature have been suggested, and that the first of these, by
which the defendant's judgment, honestly or dishonestly exer-
cised, is held to determine whether or not he is satisfied with
the plaintiff's performance, is without the support of a single
-8B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. i98; Lynn v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.,
6o Md. 404.
01M81Mchine Co. v. Chesrown, 33 Minn. 32.
88 Barlow v. Thompson, 46 Ind. 384, 388.
9 Hallidie v. Sutter St. R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 575, 576.
40 Silsby Manufacturing Co. v. Town of Chico, 24 Fed. R. 893.
41 Pringing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. R. 4i4.
-4, Brannstein v. Insurance Co., i. B. & S. 782, 795.
4 Dalhman v. King, 4 Bing. N.iC. io5; Braunstein v. Insurance Co. (supra).
48 Exch. 699.
4Stadhart v. Lee. 3 B. & S. 364.
uEllis v. Mortimer, i Bos. & Pul. (N. S.) 257.
Taylor v. Brewer, i M. & S. 290.
Clarke v. Watson, iS Com. B. (N. S.) 278.
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decision. This construction, moreover, cannot be maintained
on principle, In these cases the intention of the parties, the
main consideration in construing contracts, is that the defend-
ant shall in fact be satisfied; and the defendant's judgment in
no way determines that he is not satisfied, unless that judgment
is honestly rendered.
It has been seen that in most jurisdictions, the second con-
struction, which is the same as the first, except that the defend-
ant's judgment must be honest, is applied indiscriminately to
all kinds of contracts in which a performance satisfactory to the
defendant has been undertaken. It has been seen that in New
York, and probably in Illinois, this construction is applied only
to contracts made to gratify taste, serve personal convenience
or satisfy individual preference. That in all other cases, in
these jurisdictions, performance on the part of the plaintiff is
held to be to the satisfaction of the defendant if it would be
satisfactory to a reasonable man. This modication seems to
have resulted from the harshness, which is more apparent than
real, of the rule maintained by the weight of authority. It was
probably not applied to contracts made to serve personal taste
and convenience, because, in contracts of that nature, the inten-
tion to satisfy the defendant personally is more conspicuous.
Moreover, in these cases the modified rule would be difficult
of application, for, in that kind of contracts, reasonable men
might differ widely as to what was a satisfactory performance.
An objection to the New York view is that it renders the law
on the subject somewhat uncertain. It is difficult to determine
just what contracts will be held to fall within the rule applied
to contracts made to serve personal taste and convenience.
Numerous instances might be suggested in which this question
would be exceedingly puzzling.
The view maintained by the weight of authority seems, on
the whole; more satisfactory. It has, first, the advantage of
uniformity. The necessity of nice distinctions is obviated and
the law in this connection rendered more certain. Secondly, it
is clearly consistent with the principles usually applied in con-
struing contracts. No other intention can be found in the
wording of these contracts than that the defendant himself
was to be satisfied, and in determining this the defendant's
honest judgment is the only available criterion. - That others,
the jury or the court are satisfied with the plaintiff's perform-
ance is immaterial. The language of these contracts in no way
indicates that it was the intention of the parties to consider the
undertaking to satisfy the defendant performed, until the
122
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defendant was in fact satisfied. The fact that the defendant
was an unreasonable man should not alter the terms of the
obligation. It is true that the application of this construction
to some cases seems severe to the plaintiff. But, then, the plain-
tiff need not have made any such contract. He voluntarily
entered into the agreement and it is difficult to see why the
law should afford him any relief. This construction, moreover,
is certainly no more harsh than the general rule of law that
impossibility will not excuse the failure to perform contractual
obligations."
This view may also be supported by analogy in the con-
struction which is applied to chattel mortgages containing
what is known as the "security" or "danger" clause. By this
clause it is usually provided that the mortgagee may take pos-
session of the mortgaged property "when he may deem him-
self insecure." This is construed to give the mortgagee the
right of possession when, in good faith, he thinks himself
insecure. His opinion must be genuine, but it need not be
reasonable. The mortgagee's decision that he is insecure can
only be attacked on the ground that it was made fraudulently."
Of course, however, very clear language should be required
to support this construction. In doubtful cases a just hesita-
tion should be felt before deciding that payment is left to the
will, or even to the idiosyncrasies of the defendant."
47 Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26; Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99.
43 Thomas on Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Sec. 29. cases
cited.
"Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass., 284.
GROSVENOR NICHOLAS.
